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Slow Recoveries Through Fiscal Austerity – 
New Insights in the Effects of Fiscal Austerity
Several European countries such as Spain, Portugal, and Greece implemented austerity programs 
to cope with the government-debt crisis in the aftermath of the Great Recession: They increased 
taxes on consumption, labour, and capital and reduced government expenditures to prevent a 
large increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio. Such policies impose a greater tax burden on the econo-
my which distorts labour supply and investment. We argue that these additional tax distortions 
make it less attractive for firms to invest in adopting new technologies. New insights from the 
FRAME project show that fiscal austerity has severe negative consequences for productivity and 
economic growth in the medium-run and can lead to slow recoveries. Further, austerity may ex-
acerbate existing market failures associated with investment in research and development (R&D) 
and technology adoption. Beyond its well-known impact on aggregate demand fiscal austerity 
has a negative effect on future economic growth and productivity growth and hence also on the 
supply side. Fiscal consolidation is desirable only if it enables a quick reduction of the cost of fi-
nancing debt but this is unlikely.
 / /  N O . 2  |  M A R C H  2 0 1 9
KEY MESSAGES //
 ͮ Technology diffusion is a crucial determinant of growth. Understanding the interaction between 
technology diffusion and the state of the business cycle is important for macroeconomic policy-
making.
 ͮ New insights from the FRAME project show that fiscal austerity slows down technology diffusion. 
Through its negative effect on technology diffusion, austerity has severe negative consequences 
for productivity and economic growth in the medium-run and can lead to slow recoveries.
 ͮ Not only technology adoption but innovation activities in general are likely below their efficient 
level during a recession. Austerity measures, by adding tax distortions and reducing aggregate 
demand, amplify inefficiencies related to innovation activities. Austerity exacerbates the prob-
lem of underinvestment in R&D and innovation in a recession.
↗
Consequences of Fiscal 
Austerity for Technology 
Adoption, Growth and 
Productivity
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INTRODUCTION
Sovereign bond yields and public debt levels skyrocketed during the Great Recession and the Eu-
ropean Debt Crisis. Several European countries such as Spain, Portugal, and Greece implement-
ed austerity programs to cope with the government-debt crisis in the aftermath of the Great Re-
cession. They increased taxes on consumption, labour, and capital and reduced government 
expenditures. As depicted in Figure 1, the overall tax burden as a share of GDP in Spain, Portugal, 
and Greece increased markedly from 2009 to 2015. It was between four and six percentage points 
higher in 2015 than it was in 2009. 
Spain, for example, increased the VAT rate from 18 percent to 21 percent in 2012. The top rate 
on personal income was increased from 43 percent in 2010 to 52 percent in 2012 (European Com-
mission 2012).  
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F IGURE 1: CHANGE IN TOTAL TA X RE VENUE REL AT IVE TO GDP SINCE 2009  
IN SELEC T ED EU- COUNT RIE S
Data from OECD (2019a), Eurostat (2019a, b, c)
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F IGURE 2: CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT CONSUMP T ION REL AT IVE TO GDP  
SINCE 2009 IN SELEC T ED EU- COUNT RIE S
Data from OECD (2019b), Eurostat (2019a, b, c)
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While tax revenues were raised, government consumption was cut. Figure 2 shows the change in 
government consumption relative to GDP since 2009 for Spain, Portugal, and Greece. In 2013, 
Spanish government consumption relative to GDP was nearly 4 percent lower than in 2009. Por-
tuguese government consumption expenditures relative to GDP were down by more than 10 per-
cent and Greece cut government consumption relative to GDP by as much as 12 percent. In 2011 
alone, Spanish government consumption expenditures relative to GDP were reduced by close to 
4 percent. These austerity measures were implemented in the midst of a severe recession. In 
2013, the unemployment rate in Spain exceeded 25 percent and real GDP per capita was more 
than 6 percent below its 2009 level. 
The austerity programs stood in contrast to the traditional Keynesian approach that would have 
called for expansionary fiscal policy to support aggregate demand during the recession. In line with 
this argument, aggregate time series evidence shows that government spending has strong expan-
sionary effects in a recession. For the US, the fiscal multiplier has been estimated to be as large as 
3.6 in recessionary times (Auerbach & Gordonichenko 2012). Recent quantitative models of fiscal 
policy find substantial expansionary effects of fiscal policy with impact multipliers ranging from 1.2 
to more than 2 (Hagedorn, Manovskii & Mitman, 2018; Rendahl, 2016). Moreover, there is evidence 
that expansionary effects of fiscal policy are strong for a country that is member of a monetary un-
ion independently of the state of the business cycle. This effect is explained by the accommodative 
role played by monetary policy when expansionary fiscal policy is only conducted in some (rela-
tively small) countries of the monetary union. (Nakamura & Steinsson, 2014).
Advocates of austerity measures argued that the recession in southern Europe was largely due to 
low productivity rather than deficient demand and that consequently structural reforms and fis-
cal consolidation were the appropriate policy response. As the argument goes, austerity meas-
ures may hurt in the short run but eventually they will pay off because they will lead to greater 
investment and productivity improvements and foster growth.
The two opposing views on austerity are reflected in the different fiscal policies conducted in Eu-
rope and the US in response to rising debt-to-GDP ratios during the Great Recession. While many 
European countries resorted to strong measures of fiscal consolidation, the US refrained from such 
policies. During the Great Recession, net government borrowing as a share of GDP increased much 
more in the US than it did in the Euro Zone. Figure 3 shows that in 2011, net borrowing of the US 
government amounted to 10 percent of GDP while it was only 4 percent of GDP in the Euro Area.
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To some extent, the economic literature supports the arguments in favour of austerity measures. 
Indeed, it is important to think beyond the short-run consequences of austerity. Business cycles 
and fiscal policy have strong effects on productivity and economic growth in the long- and medi-
um-run (Barlevy, 2004; Comin & Gertler, 2006). It is less clear, however, whether austerity meas-
ures are suited to promote growth. In fact, recent research shows that fiscal austerity may hinder 
investment in R&D and in the adoption of new technologies. It will therefore have adverse con-
sequences on productivity and income growth. The precise design of austerity measures and the 
economic environment in which they are implemented is crucial for their consequences.
TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION: DRIVER OF PRODUCTIVITY  
AND GROWTH
Economic research has highlighted the role of technology adoption as an important determinant 
of productivity growth and economic development. New technologies do not improve productiv-
ity right away. Rather, firms must invest in the adoption of new technologies to make use of them 
in production. This step is important. The adoption process induces a lag between the emergence 
and the productive use of new technologies. On average it takes 45 years until a new technology 
is adopted (Comin & Mestieri 2018). The speed of technology diffusion plays a crucial role for in-
come growth. Adoption rates account for more than a quarter of the overall variation in income 
per capita across countries (Comin & Hobijn, 2010; Jerzmanowski, 2007). Adopting technologies 
seems to be a path-dependent process, in which early adopters build a comparative advantage 
in adopting technologies: Countries who first adopted a given technology tend to adopt new ones 
faster (Comin & Hobijn, 2004). Policymakers increasingly recognize the importance of technol-
ogy adoption and foster the diffusion of public research (for a discussion about Horizon Europe, 
see Krieger, Licht & Pellens, 2018). This is especially true for Europe where concerns have been 
raised that technology diffusion has slowed down and caused a decline in productivity and in-
come growth (European Commission, 2017; European Commission, 2018; OECD 2015).
In this context, it is important to take into account that current economic conditions greatly influ-
ence the speed of technology adoption. If the economic environment is not favourable, firms will 
refrain from investing in the adoption of new technologies. Innovative ideas will not translate 
into increased productivity. For this reason, temporary economic shocks can have long lasting 
consequences as they slow down the diffusion of innovative ideas (Comin and Gertler, 2006). For 
example, sluggish technology diffusion can be seen as one explanation for reduced productivity 
growth in the US following the Great Recession (Anzoategui, Comin, Gertler & Martinez, forthcom-
ing; Bianchi, Kung & Morales, 2019).
AUSTERITY LEADS TO SLOW RECOVERIES
Given the importance of technology diffusion for productivity and its strong dependence on the 
economic environment, the effects of austerity measures on technology adoption are crucial for the 
medium-run consequences of such policies. How do austerity measures affect technology adoption 
and what are the implications for productivity and income growth? These questions are at the core 
of the Horizon2020 research project FRAME (www.h2020frame.eu). As part of FRAME, Bianchi, 
Comin, Kung and Jung (2019) investigate this question focussing on the case of Spain during the 
Great Recession. Their model endogenously accounts for the connectedness of Spain with other 
European economies through the trade of goods and financial assets. The study finds support for 
strong adverse effects of austerity programs on productivity, output, and consumption. Because 
tax rates are increased to consolidate the government’s budget, investment decisions are distorted. 
Speed of Technology 
Diffusion Plays a 
Crucial Role
The FRAME Project 
Investigates the Effects 
of Austerity Programs on 
Technology Adoption
 ZEWpolicybrief |  5  //
In particular, fiscal austerity deters both investment in capital and in the adoption of new technolo-
gies. This reduces the speed of technology diffusion and leads to a slower recovery. Figure 4, which 
is taken from Bianchi, Comin, et al. (2019), shows the responses of the technology adoption rate, 
GDP, and consumption after a liquidity shock under both normal fiscal policy and fiscal austerity. 
Normal fiscal policy continues to operate the fiscal rules estimated for the pre-recession times while 
under fiscal austerity, taxes are raised to limit the increase in the dept-to-GDP ratio to 10%. Fifteen 
years (corresponds to 60 quarters in Figure 4) after the beginning of the Spanish debt crisis, both 
the technology adoption rate, output, and consumption are still more than 2 percent lower when 
austerity measures are implemented compared to a situation without austerity measures. These 
findings suggest, that the austerity measures taken in the Euro Zone have contributed to the slow 
recoveries that were observed. They may be one explanation for the very different experiences in 
the US and in most of Europe after the Great Recession. Fiscal policy was much less austere in the 
US than in the EU (see Figure 3). In turn, the recovery was faster in the US than in many European 
countries: In 2017, real GDP per capita in the US was already 6.7 percent higher than ten years be-
fore while Spanish real GDP per capita had merely returned to its pre-crisis level.
Fiscal consolidation can be achieved through various different policies. The exact design of auster-
ity programs greatly affects their consequences. There is evidence that expenditure-based consol-
idations have much higher output costs than tax based measures (Alesina et al. 2015). Within the 
set of tax-based measures, Bianchi et al. (2019a) find large differences regarding the consequenc-
es for growth depending on which types of taxes are used to increase revenues. According to their 
simulations, the adverse effects of labour tax raises on GDP and consumption are especially strong. 
Raising capital taxes is the preferred means of fiscal consolidation. For the Spanish case, an aus-
terity program that relies solely on higher capital taxes to stabilize debt leads to a trough response 
of output of –3 percent ten years after the shock. The recession is much deeper and the recovery 
slower when only the labour tax is used to stabilize debt. For this scenario, the model in Bianchi, 
Comin, et al. (2019) predicts output to be 10 percent below trend ten years after the shock.
AUSTERITY AMPLIFIES INNOVATION RELATED  
MARKET FAILURES
Due to innovation externalities, innovation investments are more pro-cyclical than would be so-
cially desirable (Barlevy, 2007). The reason is that private benefits of innovation accrue in the 
Exact Design of Austerity 
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F IGURE 4: SIMUL AT ION OF L IQUIDIT Y SHOCK
The figure shows the responses of the technology adoption rate, GDP, and consumption after a liquidity shock under normal fiscal policy (blue) and under fiscal 
austerity (green). All figures show percentage deviations from the balanced growth path. Taken from (Bianchi, Kung and Morales 2019).
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short-run and are small in a recession when profits are low. The public benefits of innovations, 
however, materialize later, after the recession, when the benefits are large. Hence, the wedge 
between private and public returns on innovation investments evolves countercyclical. Thus, if 
innovators cannot fully appropriate the public benefits of their innovation expenditures, the gap 
between the desirable and the actual investment in innovation widens during a recession. This 
dynamic inefficiency raises the costs of recessions. Austerity measures that increase taxes and 
weaken demand in a recession will widen the gap between private and social returns further and 
thereby amplify the dynamic inefficiency.
These findings have three major implications for policy. First, it is desirable to subsidize R&D and 
technology adoption particularly strongly during a recession to close the growing gap between 
private and public returns to innovation. Tax increases, by contrast, widen the gap further and 
lead to inefficiently low innovation activities. Second, policies that can help firms to reduce the 
liquidity risk of long term investments such as expansionary monetary policy are beneficial 
(Aghion, Fahri & Kharroubi, 2012). Lastly, fiscal stabilization has additional benefits beyond the 
short-run effects on employment and consumption. Stabilization policies reduce the cyclical de-
viation of R&D from its socially efficient level and thereby enhance growth. This conclusion is sup-
ported by empirical findings showing that a more countercyclical fiscal policy fosters growth 
(Aghion, Askenazy, Berman, Cette & Eymard, 2012).
WHEN AUSTERITY SUPPORTS GROWTH
An important argument in favour of austerity measures is that they reduce borrowing costs. If a 
high debt-to-GDP ratio serves as an indicator of a greater default probability, fiscal austerity can 
bring down interest rate spreads if it succeeds to reduce public debt relative to GDP. Bianchi, Comin 
et al. (2019) investigate the effects of austerity in response to a sudden increase in sovereign 
spreads. They assume that public debt directly leads to higher borrowing costs. In this situation, 
fiscal austerity can accelerate the recovery if the benefits stemming from reducing borrowing costs 
outweigh the costs of temporarily larger tax distortions. Austerity is beneficial if it can reduce the 
borrowing costs fast enough. Importantly, recent research shows that austerity is unable to reduce 
borrowing costs of financially distressed countries in the short-run (Born, Müller & Pfeiffer, 2018). 
Despite positive predicted effects with simulations, limited empirical evidence supports that aus-
terity measures can act on borrowing costs, and in turn, ease economic recovery.
CONCLUSION
Technology diffusion represents a crucial determinant of growth. Fostering the diffusion of innova-
tive ideas constitutes a new objective of innovation policies. There is evidence that the establish-
ment of applied research organizations, for example, contributes in an important way to the diffu-
sion of technology and leads to significant productivity gains (Comin, Licht, Pellens & Schubert, 
2018). However, little is known about the interaction between innovation policy, macroeconomic 
policy, and the business cycle. FRAME aims precisely at filling this gap by investigating how the 
speed of technology diffusion varies over the cycle and how it depends on macroeconomic policies.
Work by Bianchi, Comin et al. (2019) shows that the effects of fiscal austerity on the adoption of 
new technologies can account for the slow recoveries after the Great Recession in Europe. Aus-
terity measures taken in response to fiscal distress, as in Spain, Portugal, and Greece, slow down 
the adoption of new technologies and depress productivity growth in the medium run. Austerity 
is only advisable if it can reduce interest rate spreads quickly but this is unlikely for countries in 
severe financial distress.
Three Major Policy 
Implications
Austerity Can Bring 
Down Interest Rate 
Spreads
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If austerity measures are to be implemented nonetheless, they can be accompanied by policies 
that support innovation and limit the negative effects of austerity measures. In particular, it is 
important to alleviate frictions that prevent firms from taking advantage of the relatively low costs 
of expanding innovation activities during a recession. On the one hand, this includes policies 
aimed at alleviating credit constraints of firms (Aghion, Angeletos, et al. 2010). Expansionary 
monetary policy during the crisis might have been successful in this regard. On the other hand, 
innovation subsidies can be expanded to ensure that firms internalize the benefits of innovation 
even as the wedge between the private and the public return on innovation increases during the 
recession (Barlevy 2007).
More research is needed to advance the understanding of the role of innovation and technology 
diffusion for growth and its dependence on the business cycle and on macroeconomic policy. In 
particular, it will be important to further improve the measurement of technology adoption in or-
der to provide policymakers with the necessary information to monitor technology adoption more 
closely and to evaluate the effects of macroeconomic policies on the diffusion of new ideas.
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